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As Northern Ireland moves further from the period of conﬂict known as the ‘Troubles’, attention has
increasingly focussed on the social and material vestiges of that conﬂict; Northern Ireland is still a
deeply-divided society in terms of residential segregation between Catholic nationalists and Protestant
unionists, and urban areas are still, indeed increasingly, characterised by large defensive walls, known as
‘peacelines’, which demark many of the dividing lines between the two communities. In recent years a
body of literature has emerged which has highlighted the spatial association between patterns of conﬂict
fatality and proximity to peacelines. This paper assesses that relationship, arguing that previous analyses
have failed to fully take account of the ethnic complexity of inner-city Belfast in their calculations. When
this is considered, patterns of fatality were more intense within the cores or ‘sanctuaries’ of highly
segregated Catholic and Protestant communities rather than at the fracture zones or ‘interfaces’ between
themwhere peacelines have always been constructed. Using census data at a high spatial resolution, this
paper also provides the ﬁrst attempt to provide a deﬁnition of the ‘interface’ in clear geographic terms, a
spatial concept that has hitherto appeared amorphous in academic studies and media coverage of Belfast
during and since the Troubles. In doing so it embodies both the material and demographic aspects of
social division in Northern Ireland, and suggests an urgent need to reappraise the true role of these forms
of social boundary in inﬂuencing patterns of violent conﬂict.
 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY license.Introduction
Over the past decade, an increasing amount of public and aca-
demic attention has become focussed on the ‘peacelines’ which
divide highly segregated Catholic and Protestant communities
across urban Northern Ireland, but most notably within Belfast.
Despite the fact that Northern Ireland is now some ﬁfteen years on
from the Good Friday Agreement and a new consociational political
dispensation, these peacelines have not only persisted but have
actually increased rapidly in number since the substantive ‘reso-
lution’ of the Troubles (McDowell, 2009; Nagle, 2009: p. 137;
Shirlow & Murtagh, 2006: pp. 66e67). During the Troubles the
existence of these defensive barriers was easier to justify in the face
of the threat posed by paramilitary activities, but in a time of; fax: þ44 (0)161 275 8986.
ter.ac.uk (N. Cunningham),
02.
r Ltd. Open access under CC BY licensnominal ‘peace’, they often appear to outsiders as socially retro-
grade and anachronistic.
Another reason for the attention which peacelines garner is the
fact that these are typically a feature of ‘interface’ areas, a wider
term which has come to embody the spaces that lie between these
highly segregated neighbourhoods. While the threat posed by
paramilitary groups has largely receded in Belfast, these interfaces
remain sites of contestation and antagonism, particularly in the
summer months when tensions between the two communities rise
during the marching season. Annual Orange parades to celebrate
the victory in 1690 of the Protestant King William III over the
Catholic James II are particularly problematic because they disrupt
Belfast’s delicate modus vivendi as Protestant marches are seen by
Catholics to be both inherently supremacist at a general level
(McGarry & O’Leary, 1995: p. 235), but also antagonistic a local level
by transgressing the religio-political geographies which are at once
both highly pronounced and severely contested (Bryan, 2000: pp.
1e10; Cairns & Smyth, 2002: p. 147). So in short, while the major
constitutional conﬂict has been addressed, Northern Ireland is still
far from being a ‘normal’ society because so little territory ise.
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270e273), and it is in the contested margins or interfaces, where
these battles are believed to have played out with increasing in-
tensity over the last decade (Boycott, 2011; Brown, 2011).
While it is therefore clear that the boundaries between polar-
ised Catholic and Protestant neighbourhoods remain sites of ten-
sion and hostility, this paper seeks to address speciﬁcally the
relationship between peacelines, interfaces and conﬂict-related
fatal violence during the Troubles (Gafﬁkin & Morrissey, 2011: p.
209; Mesev, Shirlow, & Downs, 2009: p. 901; Shirlow, 2003a: pp.
80e81). It analyses the association between peacelines and deaths
on both spatial and temporal grounds, before addressing the role of
interface zones in the Troubles more widely. It argues that while
existing work has accurately identiﬁed deaths as occurring pri-
marily in neighbourhoods bounded by peacelines, the scales of
analysis employed have been unable to reﬂect the religio-political
complexity of inner-city Belfast. By applying spatially-detailed
data and sensitive methodologies we argue that death rates were
actually lower in immediate proximity to peacelines than they
were deeper within Catholic and Protestant enclaves. These ﬁnd-
ings extend to a fuller analysis of interface areas, giving putative
form to what is currently a vague spatial concept. The overall result
provides quantitative support for the qualitative research con-
ducted by Allen Feldman for his landmark ethnographic study of
west Belfast, Formations of Violence (1991), in which he identiﬁed
that over the course of the Troubles it was the cores or ‘sanctuaries’
of these highly segregated neighbourhoods that became the pri-
mary arenas of conﬂict.
‘An ounce of prevention is better than a ton of cure’: historical
and theoretical contexts
Primary documents from the early phase of the Troubles in Belfast
seem to make it abundantly clear why much of the city is now char-
acterised bya complex network of defensive fortiﬁcations constructed
between Catholic and Protestant areas. Theﬁrst deaths in the summer
of 1969 in the conﬂict that would become known as the ‘Troubles’
should be viewed not as the start of a process but as the result of
a deepening political and social crisis inNorthern Irish society since at
least themid-1960s. The causes of the Troubles are both complex and
contested, with contributions by Whyte (1990) and McGarry and
O’Leary (1995) remaining as scholarly landmarks in interpretations
of the period. The unresolved argument between the Catholic mi-
nority, most of whom were nationalists and sought a united Ireland,
and Protestants, the vast majority seeing themselves as pro-British
unionists, re-emerged violently in the late-1960s. Over the next
three decades, some 3500 people died as a direct result of the conﬂict,
the bulk killed by loyalist and republican paramilitaries claiming to
represent the interests of their wider Protestant and Catholic pop-
ulations (Bardon, 2005:pp. 622e666; Bew,Gibbon,&Patterson, 2002:
pp.137e187;Buckland,1981:pp.106e131; Foster,1989: pp. 582e592;
Hanley & Millar, 2009: pp. 70e107; Whyte, 2003: pp. 309e316).
From the earliest stages of the conﬂict with the deployment of
the British Army in 1969, a dominant strategic imperative has been
to keep the two communities apart (JSC, 1969). Inter-communal
blockades have been part of the city’s social history since at least
the early-nineteenth century (Hepburn, 1996: p. 123; 2008: p. 220).
However, these barricades were temporary affairs, appearing only
in periods of increased tension. With the advent of the recent
Troubles that changed as the number of permanent structures
increased dramatically (BIP, 2012: pp. 12e13). The continual chal-
lenges faced by the security services in managing low-intensity
interface hostilities between the Catholic and Protestant commu-
nities in large part explains the rationale for the building of per-
manent impediments between the two:It is true to say that there is a high incidence of hooliganism [at
the New Lodge interface].At lunchtime and in the afternoons
schoolchildren of different religions engage in throwing stones
at each other. In the evenings, in connection with attendance at
youth clubs and at nights after public houses close there are
similar and frequently more serious incidents e only timely
police intervention prevents many such incidents becoming
riots (APS (MD), 1970).
Despite being designed to protect life and prevent violence,
peacelines have themselves become a key source of conﬂict in
debates on the Troubles (Jarman, 2001: p. 36). Recent research
shows that for many residents of interface areas, physical barriers
offer them protection (Byrne, Heenan, & Robinson, 2012; Calame &
Charlesworth, 2009: p. 61) but academic critics have argued that
peacelines have had a formalising effect on religio-political differ-
ences, rendering a ‘culturally opposed immediate community as a
menacing spatial formation’ (Shirlow, 2001: p. 68). This creates fear
which in turn engenders violence so peacelines and interfaces
more generally are ‘an outcome of the broader structuration of
conﬂict but they also produce a dynamic of their own which, in
turn, feeds back into the wider reproduction of both spatial and
social distance’ (Murtagh, 2004: p. 461). These are used ‘to
construct narratives of inclusion and exclusion that deﬁne com-
munities and the ways in which they are rendered speciﬁc or
differentiated’ (Graham, 2002: p. 1008).
At a conceptual level, arguably implicit in all of the above
criticisms is the sense of peacelines as articulations of state power.
But if this is indeed the case it is in the qualiﬁed and partial ex-
ercise of that power, as the violence which has afﬂicted these
areas can be seen as a manifestation of the sort of ‘uncontrollable
autonomy’ identiﬁed by Lefebvre in The Production of Space (1991:
p. 26). Furthermore, Till et al. (2013: p. 9) have recently argued
that in many respects, such barriers represent not the authority of
the state but rather the limits of that authority, or as Brown (2010)
has put it, as being emblematic of ‘waning sovereignty’, declining
civic deference and the inability of states to control their pop-
ulations by any means other than the crudest of techniques. For
Loyd, Mitchelson, and Burridge (2012: pp. 5e6) however, the
proliferation of walls, prisons and other spaces of incarceration
are symptomatic of a much wider crisis in late-capitalist societies
in which these instruments of state violence act to protect the
interests of wealth holders and accumulators. This may well be
true, but in the Northern Ireland context walls have not acted to
protect the interests of citizens from advancing ‘would-be’ citi-
zens who both share common capitalist self-interests (Loyd et al.,
2012: pp. 6e8) as is the case for example, on the border between
Mexico and the U.S.A. or on the margins of the European Union.
Rather, they have tended to deﬁne pre-existing boundaries be-
tween groups who cannot be reconciled in terms of religio-
political identity, and therefore Reece Jones’ (2011: p. 215) con-
ceptualisation perhaps has greater salience when he has argued
that borders more generally act ‘as important sites for the per-
formance of both security and citizenship. They are the line that
symbolises the distinction between the ‘homeland’ and the
outside world’.
The identiﬁcation of these liminal spaces as performative zones
gains even greater conceptual and empirical substance through a
consideration of the work of the American cultural anthropologist
Allen Feldman. In Formations of Violence (1991) he explores through
a detailed and spatially-nuanced qualitative approach how the
working-class Catholic and Protestant communities of west Belfast
sought to organise space in ways that subordinated patterns of
violence to the needs of everyday life:
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tion of the spatial dimension of human association and the
spaces of violence. It attempted to preserve the subordination of
violent enactment to the prerequisites of residence and kinship
through spatial conﬁnement of violence. The sanctum was
constituted by a space that was reserved for residence and
kinship and by a complementary space, the barricades-interface
continuum, reserved for the ideological and material repro-
duction of community through violence (36).
The creation of the sanctuary is both contingent upon and
instrumental in the development of ‘topophilia’, in which space is
eulogised and set apart, necessitating defence (Feldman, 1991: p.
38). In the words of Bachelard (1994: pp. 217e218):
Outside and inside are always intimate e they are always ready
to be reversed, to exchange their hostility. If there exists such a
border-line surface between inside and outside, this surface is
painful on both sides.
For Feldman, this surface has clear manifestation in the inter-
face, designed to serve as the place of violence (1991: p. 37). Yet
despite these socio-spatial formulations, the division between the
interface and the sanctuary became compromised as the conﬂict
ground on, worn away by both state actors and paramilitaries, the
latter having justiﬁed their territorial activities as defensive:
Yet paramilitary practice created cycles of violence that excee-
ded the spaces and performative prescriptions that had been
predicated by the sanctuary/interface construct. This space was
rapidly instrumentalized by paramilitary organizations as they
converted the sanctuary into a base for operations. Chronic
paramilitary violence eventually played a pivotal role in the
disintegration of the community space as a sanctuary to the
extent that it attracted retroactive violence aimed at the
confessional space (Feldman, 1991: p. 39).
The distinction between the performative and the fatal is critical
to an understanding of what the location of violence during the
Troubles actually signiﬁes. While both forms of violence are inte-
gral to the conﬂict, being linked at one level through a shared
geographical theorisation of bodily practices and resistance (Thrift,
1997), at another level there is also an important difference. In-
terfaces have long acted as spaces for the symbolic performance
of difference, but the data to be presented here suggests that it
was actually within the cores of polarised communities that the
fatal conﬂict played out.
Peacelines and interfaces are bad things at an emotional and
psychological level: they engender fear and hatred of those on the
other side of them (Shirlow, 2001: pp. 67e74; 2003a: pp. 76e91;
2003b: pp. 77e94). It is also impossible to dispute the notion that
interfaces have historically, and continue to be the foci of intense
inter-communal hostility and there is a body of literature which
sees such communities as being economically, socially and spatially
disadvantaged by the presence of the structures as natural com-
mercial and infrastructural patterns are distorted and investment is
deterred by the stigma of locating in an interface zone (Murtagh,
2002: pp. 45e52; Shirlow, 2006: p. 103; Shirlow & Murtagh,
2006: pp. 64e65). Interface violence has been an ongoing source
of this negativity, and while it remains a serious and ongoing
problem, the key fact is that such violence has tended to be more
sporadic, more directed against property and less often resulting in
loss of life (Bollens, 1999: p. 77; Cunningham, 2014: pp. 247e263;
Jarman, 2003: p. 228; Jarman & O’Halloran, 2001: pp. 6e10). In thispaper however, the focus is on the view that peacelines and
interface zones may have acted to focus patterns of political killing
during the Troubles. For some authors, this possibility has been
merely implicit in their ﬁndings (Mesev et al., 2009: p. 901; Shirlow,
2003a: pp. 80e81), but others have more explicit, arguing that
peacelines possibly acted as ‘magnets’ for fatal violence (Gafﬁkin &
Morrissey, 2011: p. 209). This paper seeks to build upon this
invaluable body of scholarship through a closer spatial and tem-
poral examination of the evidence.
Data and methodologies
This paper uses geographical information systems (GIS) tech-
niques to examine the relationship between patterns of fatality
during the Troubles in Belfast and the boundaries between highly
segregated Catholic and Protestant communities in the city. The
analysis proceeds by addressing both thematerial manifestations of
the social and political divide in Northern Ireland in the form of
peacelines, before engaging with the more substantive de-
mographic cleavage in the city’s residential geography through an
evaluation of the role of interface areas more generally. Geography
has a particularly vital role to play in understanding the dynamics
of the political conﬂict in Northern Ireland; as Stewart (1977: p. 56)
has put it:
Topography is the key to the Ulster conﬂict. Unless you know
exactly who lives where, and why, much of it does not make
sense.Ulster’s troubles arise from the fact that people who live
there know this information to the square inch, while strangers
know nothing of it.
This paper is based on two geo-referenced datasets that
together allow us to explore in detail the micro-geographies of fatal
violence during the Troubles. The ﬁrst of these records the location
of each conﬂict-related killing that took place in Belfast during the
Troubles together with information on which group the victim and
perpetrator came from. The second is data from the censuses of
Northern Ireland for 1971, 1991 and 2001 which, uniquely in the
UK, are available for the major urban areas at 100 m grid square
using units that are consistent over time (Shuttleworth & Lloyd,
2009: pp. 213e216). The use of standardised areal units presents
a solution to a major problem in time-series analyses meaning that
it not necessary to rely on population estimates which would
otherwise result from interpolating census datasets from one set of
boundaries onto another (Gregory & Ell, 2007: p. 138). The beneﬁt
of using such a detailed census geography will become apparent
very quickly in identifying where the boundaries between polar-
ised Catholic and Protestant neighbourhoods lie, even if these
boundaries are not marked by physical barriers in the form of
peacelines. Northern Ireland’s censuses have always included data
on religion, as well as the more conventional census variables on
topics such as household size and themes relating to deprivation.
Unfortunately the 1981 census was taken against the backdrop of
increased political tensions arising from the hunger strikes and
suffers from some serious problems, speciﬁcally an under-
enumeration of Catholics (O’Grada, 1997: p. 209; Shuttleworth &
Lloyd, 2009: p. 216). For this reason it is not used in this paper
and the analysis presented here covers the period between the
initial outbreak of violence in 1969 and 2001. The reason for ending
in 2001 is so that the study period may be book-ended by that
year’s census, but at a more fundamental level it marks a point in
Northern Ireland’s history at which the political settlement
embodied in the Good Friday Agreement could be seen to have
taken hold, with power devolved to a new legislative assembly at
Stormont, paramilitary decommissioning of weapons and most
Fig. 1. Temporal distribution of Troubles deaths in Belfast.
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(Bew et al., 2002: pp. 244e245; English, 2003: pp. 331e336; Taylor,
2002: p. 390).
The database of killings was compiled by Malcolm Sutton and is
hosted by the University of Ulster’s ‘Conﬂict Archive on the
InterNet’ (CAIN) (CAINa, 2013). This database was initially created
to act as a memorial to those who had died during the conﬂict and
formed the basis for a book, Bear in Mind These Dead.An Index of
Deaths from the Conﬂict in Northern Ireland (Sutton, 1994). The
process of updating the database has continued to the present to
include new deaths as they occurred. While the rate of entries has
declined substantially since the late 1990s and the signing of the
Good Friday Agreement, the vital role of keeping the information
up to date, and more speciﬁcally, correcting the information on
individuals already within the record, continues. This highlights the
uniquely interactive nature of the resource as one in which the
people most directly affected by its contents, the bereaved relatives
of those therein, have a direct input into the ongoing process of
perfecting its accuracy and detail (Lynn, 2011). For the purposes of
this study, deaths occurring within the Belfast Urban Area (BUA)
between 1969 and 2001 form the basis for analysis.
The Sutton database provides information on the name of each
person killed, the date of the incident leading to their death,
together with the person’s age and gender. It also contains in-
formation on the background of the victim including their reli-
gion and whether they were civilians, members of either a
republican or loyalist paramilitary group, or members of the se-
curity forces, a category which mainly consists of the British
Army, the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR), RUC and prison ofﬁ-
cers. For most of this paper the broad classes of ‘security forces’,
‘republican paramilitary’, ‘loyalist paramilitary’ and ‘civilian’ will
be used with civilians being further sub-divided into Catholics
and Protestants. In the vast majority of cases information is also
given on the afﬁliation of the perpetrator of the attack using the
same classes.
The database consists of a total of 3524 deaths in the period up
to 2001, of which 1541 or 46 percent occurred within the BUA. The
victim proﬁle was overwhelmingly male at 94 percent of the total,
and young, with a mean age of just 32. Loyalists were responsible
for 67 percent of all random killings, in which the circumstances
suggested that the victim was selected by chance or where the
casualty was the unfortunate victim of an indiscriminate gun or
bomb attack. Republicans accounted for approximately 29
percent of these killings while in contrast, they were responsible
for 52 percent of ‘targeted’ killings, as opposed to 30 for loyalist
paramilitary groups and seventeen percent for the various British
security organisations. Over three-quarters of all victims in Bel-
fast died in gun attacks, with eighteen percent being killed as a
result of bomb blasts and just three percent due to blunt force
trauma or stabbing. Fig. 1 shows that deaths were also heavily
skewed to the early period of conﬂict, with almost one in ﬁve
occurring within a single year of the Troubles, 1972. This is
important because the temporal spread of fatalities effectively
represents the inverse pattern to that of peaceline construction
during the conﬂict, which intensiﬁed much later on from the
1990s, well after fatalities had peaked. Such was the intensity of
violence in the city in 1972 that a U.S. State Department ofﬁcial
wrote to the Belfast consul ‘quite incredible e I believe you are
now in the most dangerous posting in the world, not excluding
Saigon’ (Hillenbrand, 1972).
Within Belfast civilians made up a majority of victims at 64
percent, members of the security forces nineteen percent and the
combined total for loyalist and republican paramilitaries was
seventeen percent. Yet in terms of responsibility for these deaths,
between them loyalists and republicans caused 84 percent of allfatalities, with thirteen percent being attributed to the security
services. If we focus solely on the victims of paramilitary violence,
of the 620 victims killed by loyalists, 71 percent were Catholic ci-
vilians, suggesting that these non-combatants presented a useful
proxy for the aggressions of Protestant armed groups rather than
members of organisations like the PIRA, who were much harder to
target (O’Duffy & O’Leary, 1990: pp. 326e327). While republicans
were responsible for fewer civilian deaths at 299 or 30 percent of
the total, almost two-thirds of these victims were Protestant It is
therefore difﬁcult to ﬁnd fault with O’Duffy and O’Leary’s (1990: pp.
325e327) assessment that a PIRA non-civilian ‘kill-ratio’ of only
just over three out of every ﬁve deaths constituted a ‘success’ rate
which ‘indicates a high degree of incompetence, error or malevo-
lence with respect to civilians’.
The database also provided a textual description of where each
killing took place. We used maps and other sources such as
contemporary newspaper reports, to allocate a grid reference to
each killing based uponwhere the incident occurred, or failing that,
where the victim’s body was found. We consider this method to be
a more direct measure of conﬂict intensity than using the home
addresses of victims. The primary reason for this has already been
identiﬁed by Fay et al. (1997: pp. 50, 56); a substantial number of
the victims were either not from Northern Ireland (in the case of
the vast majority of members of the British Army, for example), or
resided in suburban areas well away from the locations of greatest
violence (as in the case of most members of the civilian police force,
the RUC), thus providing a somewhat misleading picture. With this
geographical reference it was then possible to convert the database
into a layer for analysis within a GIS.
To summarise the pattern of deaths kernel density smoothing
was used to estimate the intensity of fatal violence across Belfast.
Fig. 2 shows quartiles of these densities. It indicates that the areas
with the greatest number of killings were located within a compact
part of inner-city Belfast covering the Catholic neighbourhoods of
the Ardoyne, New Lodge, Falls and Protestant Shankill to the west
and north of the city centre, but also including the Short Strand and
Lower Ormeau, nationalist enclaves immediately to the east and
south of the city centre respectively. It also shows the peacelines
extant in 2001 and it is apparent that the greatest intensities of
violence do indeed appear to be in neighbourhoods bounded by
these structures. Fig. 3 develops the socio-economic picture of
these areas in terms of both deprivation and segregation using a
bivariate Local Indicator of Spatial Association (LISA) (Anselin,1995:
pp. 93e115). This method groups the census grid squares into
statistically signiﬁcant clusters in terms of the two variables, levels
of deprivation and segregation, thus allowing us to deﬁne areas that
Fig. 2. Peacelines and inter-quartile ranges of densities of conﬂict deaths.
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segregated. The map shows that the highest levels of fatality were
clearly concentrated in a relatively small band of inner-city neigh-
bourhoods which were also characterised by high levels of depri-
vation and segregation using the bivariate LISA classiﬁcation
technique. However, it was not the case that all highly segregated
and deprived parts of the city witnessed high levels of political
deaths. Fig. 4 illustrates this, by tracking the density of deaths in
these Catholic and Protestant areas of high deprivation and segre-
gation in terms of their distance from Belfast City Hall in the centre
of the city. This makes clear that there was a marked decline in
levels of fatality as one moves outward from the inner-city areas (1
and 2 km bands) towards the outskirts even in areas characterised
by high levels of deprivation and segregation. What this analysis
means is that deaths were a feature only of particular highly
segregated and deprived inner-city areas, while neighbourhoods
of similar socio-economic proﬁle in the suburbs saw far fewer
fatalities.The patterns of fatal conﬂict around these central areas become
all the more remarkable when we consider the major population
shifts that occurred in Belfast over the period of the conﬂict. In the
three decades between 1971 and 2001, the population of the BUA
fell by approximately 25 percent as a massive slum clearance pro-
gramme moved people out of the old segregated inner-city
neighbourhoods to peripheral estates and new towns across and
beyond Greater Belfast (Brett, 1986; Mathew,1964; Melaugh,1994).
These momentous demographic shifts frequently resulted in the
mere transplantation of the old urban patterns of sectarian settle-
ment to new semi-rural spaces (Bardon, 2005: pp. 791e792; Darby,
1971; Darby & Morris, 1971; Osborne & Singleton, 1982: pp. 179e
180; Simpson, 1973). However the geography of conﬂict did not
appear to follow suit. Fig. 5 measures Troubles deaths in ﬁve-year
windows either side of 1971 and 1991 by distance from Belfast
City Hall. This shows that relative to the changing population base,
death rates actually steepened near the city centre as the popula-
tion fell despite a dramatic drop in overall levels of killing over the
Fig. 3. Peacelines, inter-quartile ranges of densities of conﬂict deaths and bivariate LISA analysis of deprivation and religio-political segregation in Belfast at 100 m2.
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Fig. 4. Mean death rates per km2 by distance from Belfast City Hall for Catholic and
Protestant bivariate LISA clusters of high deprivation and high segregation.
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creases in death rates at the edge of the city indicates that popu-
lation trends seem to have had little impact upon the conﬂict’s
geography. It would seem then that demography, deprivation and
segregation per se have limited explanatory power in the spatial
distribution of Troubles deaths.
Belfast’s peacelines and the geography of political violence
Spatial problems
Fig. 6 is a map of peacelines that were in situ in 2001, overlaid
with various radials indicating a number of speciﬁed distances from
each barrier. The most striking and well-known example in the city
is that which separates the Catholic Falls from the Protestant
Shankill district (Fig. 7), a gargantuan concrete and metal structure
which is up to 18mhigh in places, scything through thewest Belfast
cityscape. While walls such as that in Fig. 7 are strikingly obvious,
the process of quantifying peacelines and interfaces is not as
straightforward as atﬁrst itmight appear. Jarman (2002: pp. 22e23)
has noted that in some places peacelinesmake use of barriers in the
built environment that are already in place, and which are resi-
dentially neutral, such as parks or public utility buildings (Jarman,
2002: pp. 22e23). Due to the variety of forms that peacelines take,
and the fact that by no means all of the boundaries between
segregated Catholic and Protestant areas are marked by such
structures, the analysis in this paper will take two forms. The ﬁrst
will address thosematerial structures or peacelines identiﬁedby the
Belfast Interface Project (BIP) as existing in 2001 (BIP, 2012). How-
ever, it is recognised that there has existed a signiﬁcant under-
enumeration of the actual number of barriers that have been builtFig. 5. Population-based percentage difference in observed versus expected death
rates within ﬁve-year windows of analysis for 1971 and 1991 by distance from Belfast
City Hall.in the city in ofﬁcial statistics, a state of affairs which it has been
argued by Melaugh (CAINb, 2012) may be down to the fact that re-
sponsibility for their construction, maintenance and quantiﬁcation
has never been vested in one single body. By deﬁnition, these extra
physical barriersmust have been constructed in areaswhereheavily
segregated Catholic and Protestant districts were spatially pro-
pinquitous. Therefore, a secondary stage of analysiswill examine the
pattern of deaths in all interface zones, using awider spatial formula
to deﬁne these areas in order to attempt to understandhowpatterns
of violence relate to demographic deﬁnitions of the cores and pe-
ripheries of highly segregated neighbourhoods.
In a 2006 article in the Observer newspaper under the headline,
‘Peacelines are where danger lurks’, the claim was made that 85
percent of killings occurred within 1000 yards of the walls
(McDonald, 2006), a feature which both helped to construct and
reﬂect the place of peacelines in the urban terror imaginary. Whilst
an accurate and stark observation, the use of such radials of prox-
imity to draw associations between peacelines and political deaths
raises deeper questions. If we refer back to Fig. 3, the contested
religio-political geography of central Belfast is in reality so complex
that a considerable portion of the inner city can be seen to liewithin
reasonably close proximity to a peaceline. Bollens (1999: p. 209) has
accurately described this as a, ‘hyper-segregated sectarian and
peaceline geography’. Indeed, this has also led another leading
expert on peacelines and interfaces in Northern Ireland to remark
that this renders the use of such bandwidths of association to be
‘potentially meaningless’ (Jarman, personal communication, 2012).
This in turn is a reﬂection on the capabilities and limitations of
fundamentally interrogative technologies such as GIS; it is excellent
at identifying and visualising seemingly obvious patterns, but these
visualisations are often better at raising questions and challenging
existing hypotheses than they are at providing answers (Gregory &
Healey, 2007: pp. 638e653).
The best way to illustrate the potentially distorting power of
scale is to map what these values mean on the ground. Fig. 6 shows
that by applying a Euclidian bandwidth of 500 m to peacelines we
effectively cover the entire urban area of inner-city Belfast, with the
exception of a narrow strip land of no more than 200 m in width
running down the middle of the Shankill district. Expanding the
radius to 1000 m (which approximates closely to the 1000 yard
distance used in the 2006 Observer article), means that we
completely cover all of west and central Belfast, in addition to vast
swathes of the north and east of the city, stretching beyond the
western extents of the urban boundary. Due to the highly-complex
religio-political geography of inner-city Belfast, the result of using
such coarse bandwidths to analyse peaceline fatalities is to effec-
tively imply that all deaths which accrued from the political conﬂict
across the entire time period can be reduced to interface hostility.
If we explore in much closer spatial detail the relationship be-
tween Troubles deaths, background population and peaceline
proximity (Fig. 8), we ﬁnd that while death rates were indeed high
in immediate proximity to peacelines, they actually increased as
distance increased, peaking some 200e300 m away from the
structures. While these distances may appear to be relatively small,
we must remember that against the intricate religio-political ge-
ography of inner Belfast this constitutes the difference between the
cores and peripheries of highly segregated communities such as the
Ardoyne, Falls and Shankill.
Temporal problems
The temporal dimension of the relationship between peacelines
and Troubles deaths is even more unsettling than the spatial. Fig. 1
clearly identiﬁed that deaths during the conﬂict were heavily
skewed towards the early phase of the conﬂict in the 1970s (Bew &
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McVea, 2007: p. 137; O’Leary & McGarry, 1993: p. 31). However
the BIP (2012: p. 12) identify that the majority of peacelines were
built in the 1990s, well after deaths had peaked. Indeed, more
fortiﬁcations were built in the second half of the decade following
the ceaseﬁre declared by the PIRA in 1994 than were built in the
years preceding it (BIP, 2012: pp. 12e13). While erection dates for
most barriers remain elusive the respected CAIN service has con-
ducted some research on these and hasmanaged to identify speciﬁc
years of construction for a number of locations around the city
(CAINb, 2013). This provides the basis for a temporal analysis of
patterns of fatality before and after the walls were put in place. The
locations of peacelines for which the year of construction is known
are shown in Fig. 9.Fig. 6. Peacelines, distance raFig. 10 aggregates deaths at these locations at a range of spatial
scales in the three years immediately preceding and following the
building of the barriers. The graph clearly shows a marked decline
in deaths in proximity to the peacelines in the years immediately
following their construction. Indeed, deaths in proximity to
peacelines peaked in the year before they were built and declined
sharply and consistently thereafter. In part, this is a reﬂection of the
broader temporal pattern already identiﬁed with deaths heavily
skewed to the early part of the conﬂict (Fig. 1), but bearing in mind
that most barriers date from the 1990s, these statistics, together
with the spatial evidence, appear to question the notion that
peacelines may have acted as ‘magnets’ for violence (Gafﬁkin &
Morrissey, 2011: p. 209). Indeed, it would seem that they had the
opposite effect andmay have precipitated a decline in fatal levels ofdials and conﬂict deaths.
Fig. 7. The Falls-Shankill peaceline at Cupar Way. Fig. 8. Mean (1971, 1991 and 2001) population-based death rates and peaceline
proximity.
Fig. 9. Locations of peacelines for which year of construction is known.
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Fig. 10. Deaths within three spatial ranges in the three years immediately prior to, and
following the construction of the peacelines identiﬁed in Fig. 9.
N. Cunningham, I. Gregory / Political Geography 40 (2014) 64e78 73violence in the areas inwhich theywere built, or at least in possibly
displacing these killings to other areas.
Widening the focus: deﬁning the interface
The shortcoming of all this analysis so far is that we have only
addressed the materiality of the religio-political divide in Belfast.
While peacelines have proliferated over the last twenty years it is
true to say that not every boundary between highly segregated
Catholic and Protestant areas is marked by a physical barrier. To
address this problem, the window of analysis will be widened to
incorporate interface areas more generally. Whilst it is illogical to
have a peaceline without an interface, it is quite possible to have an
interface without a peaceline. Indeed, many parts of the city are
marked by such informal barriers, which might take the form of
serendipitous physical features such as rivers or streams, or be the
result of subtle urban planning interventions as with the con-
struction of small industrial units to buffer the Protestant Tiger’s
Bay from the Catholic Lower Antrim Road (Bollens, 1999: p. 127;
Jarman, 2002: p. 23). It may even be something as seemingly
innocuous as ‘a turn in the road, a local landmark or a row of shops’
(Jarman, 2005: p. 6). There is no ofﬁcial criteria for what actually
constitutes an interface area, although the CAIN website deﬁnes it
as ‘The boundary between Catholic (Nationalist) and Protestant
(Unionist) areas, especially where two highly segregated areas are
situated close to each other’ (CAINc, 2013). According to Jarman and
O’Halloran (2001: pp. 3e4) the Northern Ireland Housing Executive
(NIHE) determine segregated areas as those with Catholic or Prot-
estant populations of 90 percent or more. Using the 100 m grid
squares it is possible to bring the demographic dimension into the
analysis with remarkable spatial granularity.
To incorporate these areas into the analysis, all polarised Cath-
olic and Protestant 100 m2 grid cells in the city in either 1971, 1991
or 2001 (i.e. those with populations of one group or another equal
to or in excess of 90 percent of the total), and with centroids (centre
points) lying within 100 m of an equally polarised cell dominated
by the other group, have been deﬁned as ‘interface cells’. This is in
addition to all cells within 100 m proximity to a peaceline,
regardless of whether those cells are populated or not. The deﬁ-
nition of interface here covers approximately eighteen percent of
the city’s populated space. As Fig. 11 shows, this provides a wider
spatial deﬁnition that embodies both the material and de-
mographic boundaries which deﬁne the city. As is clear, much ofthe inner city forms a large, contiguous interface, running from the
Ardoyne in the west and arcing through awide swathe of inner-city
north and west Belfast. Other substantial interface zones are to be
found in and around the Short Strand in east Belfast and Ander-
sonstown in the far south-west. Strikingly though, it is no longer
simply the traditional working-class areas of the city which fall
within this classiﬁcation; more afﬂuent parts of north Belfast now
also come within this deﬁnition of the interface. This accords with
qualitative research which has found that during the ﬁrst half of the
2000s, the meaning of the interface seemed to be morphing to
incorporate areas of high owner-occupation (Jarman, 2005: p. 6).
Such largely lower-middle class areas were previously considered
outside the reach of inter-communal hostility.
Using the samemethodology as employed for peacelines, Fig. 12
shows death rates based on mean population across the period of
the Troubles and distance from interface zones. Again, a very
similar pattern emerges. Death rates increase outside the interface
markedly, peaking sharply in the band 100e200 m outside. Once
more, it is important to emphasise that while the distances
involved appear small, they are Euclidian, and in terms of the
elaborate patterns of religio-political segregation in inner Belfast,
these areas frequently represent the difference between the cores
and peripheries of polarised communities.2
So in terms of the most extreme measure of political and social
unrest, interface areas and those in immediate proximity to
peacelines which equate to the peripheries of segregated commu-
nities were not as violent as the cores or ‘sanctuaries’ of respective
Catholic and Protestant enclaves. Furthermore, this relationship
holds across a variety of individual status groups during the Trou-
bles (Fig. 13). All groups registered higher death rates beyond the
interface zone. It is however interesting to note that deaths among
Catholic civilians rose nearer to interface zones, a trend that is not
found in any other group. This may reﬂect the greater tendency for
loyalist paramilitaries to target Catholics in ethnically marginal
spaces within Belfast at certain times during the conﬂict, particu-
larly in the early- to mid-1970s (Rose, 1972).
The breakdown of the interface and the ‘sanctuary’:
comparative and policy implications
The patterns uncovered in the above analyses challenge current
orthodoxies on the relationship between peacelines, interfaces and
geographies of extreme violence during the Troubles. They also
challenge us to explain them. Why did the patterns emerge and
more importantly, why do they matter?
The patterns of fatality identiﬁed in this paper do support the
work of Feldman (1991) in which he identiﬁed that the ‘sanctuary/
interface’ was a social construct designed by residents to protect
their respective Catholic and Protestant enclaves, but it was one
that collapsed as both sanctums became the primary locations of
fatal violence and the interfaces were left to fester as the ‘dead
zones’ of dereliction and low-intensity conﬂict. As time wore on
both loyalist and republican paramilitaries found it increasingly
difﬁcult, or rather impossible to offer spatial protection to ‘their’
communities and were thus conﬁned to retaliatory strikes against
each other’s sanctuaries (Northern Ireland Cabinet, 1971). The
inability of either paramilitary grouping to offer comprehensive
defence to their respective sanctuaries led to an iterative and
intensifying cycle of violence. In October 1993 a PIRA bomb
exploded prematurely in a busy ﬁsh shop on the Shankill Road,
above which senior loyalist paramilitaries had been scheduled to
meet (Wood, 2006: p. 170). The bomb killed ten people including
the PIRA bomber himself, eight other victims being innocent
Protestant shoppers and just one being a member of the loyalist
Ulster Defence Association (Bew & Gillespie, 1999: p. 277).
Fig. 11. The interface and distance radials.
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of the Shankill Road was a series of loyalist attacks on Catholic
enclaves:
The loyalist onslaught directly challenged the IRA’s raison d’être,
and the pressures on the organization in Belfast to respondwere
enormous. After all, the Provisionals had come into existence to
defend the city’s vulnerable Catholic communities, and any
failure to hit back at those behind the attacks could provoke
uncontrollable freelance operations by IRA units (Moloney,
2002: p. 414).
It is vital to understand the true role of the interface during the
conﬂict because it has profound implications for how we concep-
tualise the Troubles as a conﬂict. Interpretations of conﬂict are not
neutral but constitutive and the implicit assumption that the focus
on interface hostility potentially sets up is that deaths during the
conﬂict primarily occurred as a result of the sort of ongoing terri-
torial antagonisms which have come through in the archivalmaterials and secondary literature that this paper has dealt with.
Certainly interface zones were, and indeed remain places of
considerable tension between the Catholic and Protestant pop-
ulations (Alleyne, 2012; McDonald, 2012a, 2012b; Moriarty, 2012).
However, those tensions have historically tended to manifest
themselves in terms of frequent low-intensity conﬂicts, which
albeit had the potential to escalate into more serious confronta-
tions. Rapidly after the initial outbreak of violence in 1969 the
sanctuaries rather than the interfaces increasingly became the sites
of fatal violence between the protagonists. Deaths arising from low-
intensity stand-offs were comparatively rare during the Troubles
and the vast majority of victims died, either deliberately or some-
times accidentally, as the result of planned actions and spatial
transgressions by political or nominally-political actors such as
paramilitaries and the security forces.
If the focus on material boundaries in relation to conﬂict deaths
has been understandable but perhaps misplaced, this has clear
implications for the frequency with which Belfast is compared to
other urban sites of ethnic conﬂict around the world, most notably
Fig. 12. Mean (1971, 1991 and 2001) population-based death rates and interface
proximity.
Fig. 14. Population change between 1971 and 2001 in the interface and neighbouring
zones.
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through and around Jerusalem bears little resemblance to Belfast’s
peacelines in either its conception, reception or purpose. Bollens
(2013: pp. 186e206) argues that in Jerusalem, as in Sarejevo and
Beirut, the fortiﬁcation was designed to insulate the entire urban
space from exogenous threats of ethnic violence, and by con-
stricting access to the city, to neutralise the dangers emerging from
suspect minorities within. In Belfast, this was not the case as the
peacelines are piecemeal and partial, still reﬂective of the highly-
complex religio-political geographies that exist within the city,
while Jerusalem has since been nominally ‘reuniﬁed’ (Kliot &
Mansﬁeld, 1999: pp. 217e218) even if it remains highly segre-
gated in reality. Even more signiﬁcant is the historical fact that the
construction of Belfast’s peacelines has been largely consensual, an
acknowledgement of pre-existing and long-standing ethnic divides
within the city. In Jerusalem on the other hand, the building of the
currentWest Bank barrier has clearly acted to marginalise the city’s
minority Arab population (Asser, 2010; Bollens, 1999: pp. 95e97;
Tait, 2013), while in Belfast it could be said that working-class
Catholic and Protestant neighbourhoods have been equally stig-
matised by the construction of these barriers. It is symptomatic that
it is their potential removal that is leading to tensions rather than
their erection because for better or worse, these peacelines have
contained the demographic pressures within the city that it will be
argued are a more serious threat to inter-group stability (Boal &
Douglas, 1982: pp. 339e340; Bollens, 1999: p. 108). This research
therefore clearly has important policy ramiﬁcations in the light of
contemporary political moves towards the removal of peacelines
(Blevins, 2013; Buckler, 2013).Fig. 13. Population-based percentage difference in observed versus expected death
rates by categories of victim against distance from the interface.If peacelines and interfaces were not therefore the epicentres of
political fatality during the Troubles, they were, and continue to be
the focus for an ongoing, lower-intensity form of conﬂict, and it is
through an understanding of interface population dynamics over
the course of the Troubles that we can start to understand what the
stakes really are in this regard. It is generally agreed in the academic
and public spheres that violence has precipitated population
change in Northern Ireland (Boal, 1987: p. 118; Darby, 1976: p. 25;
Kennedy & Birrell, 1978: p. 104). However, it is likely to be in the
mundane and quotidian manifestations of inter-communal hostil-
ity that the best explanations lie for the patterns of demographic
decline in interface zones that come through in Fig. 14. The graph
shows a remarkably clear association between rates of population
loss and proximity to the interface, and while most of the inner city
suffered dramatic population decline during the Troubles, that
decline was most acute in the interface and in areas closest to it. Yet
while such loss might appear extraordinary at ﬁrst glance, in the
wider comparative context of post-industrial, north British cities it
is much less so. Over the same thirty year period, the core popu-
lation of Liverpool and Manchester also fell by a quarter, Glasgow
by considerably more (CDU, 2013). So while there is a tendency to
think of the experience of Belfast or Northern Ireland more
generally as exceptional (Aughey, 2005: p. 63), in terms of trans-
national processes of urban decline and suburbanisation its expe-
rience is far from unique.
However, what does set the city apart is the fact that those
patterns of decline have not affected the Catholic and Protestant
populations of Belfast equally. Fig. 15 shows that population loss in
the interface and surrounding zones has dramatically andFig. 15. Catholic and non-Catholic population change between 1971 and 2001 in the
interface and neighbouring zones.
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city.3 While non-Catholic population loss across the city as a whole
was drastic at around 45 percent, in ﬁve of the seven interface
proximity bands it outstripped even that ﬁgure. This in turn has had
an interactive effect on the dynamics of interface hostility during
the Troubles and beyond, with Bollens (1999: p. 108) arguing that
Protestant population decline in interface areas has been a far
greater cause of antagonism than any motivations accruing from
the existence of peacelines and/or interfaces in and of themselves.
So the interface and surrounding areas delineates a space which is
not just a political battleground but a demographic one; it has
become a wry truism in Northern Irish political circles that re-
publicans were too shrewd to admit they had lost the war, while
loyalists were too foolish to realise they had won (Campbell &
Hagerty, 2011: p. 66; O’Doherty, 2008; Patterson, 2012: p. 249).
However, if Protestants more generally had won the political
struggle, they had unquestionably lost the demographic one on the
interface. An example of just such an area comes in the Torrens
estate, which is surrounded by much larger Catholic districts such
as the Ardoyne and Oldpark. Here the small remaining Protestant
populationwas, depending on your viewpoint, either ﬁnally purged
or chose to vacate the area en masse during the summer of 2004 as
the sectarian boundaries continue to harden (BBC, 2004;
McKittrick, 2004):
Ms Ferguson’s 91-year-old grandmother, Betsy McClenaghan e
whowas also moving e told one reporter: “I have come through
the blitzes and the 1932 riots but I’ve never known an upheaval
like it.” The intimate intensity of the cruelty in such places can
be viscerally shocking. Earlier this year, in a Belfast newspaper, a
15-year-old Torrens resident called Sarah Kell e whose father,
Trevor, a taxi-driver, was murdered by a republican gunman e
described how certain local Catholic schoolchildren regularly
shouted “Where’s your da?” at her. Grafﬁti on their street
echoed the taunts: “Sarah Kell, where’s your da, ha ha ha”
(McCartney, 2004).
Conclusions
This paper has presented new empirical research which chal-
lenges current thinking on the spatial relationship between
peacelines, interfaces and conﬂict deaths during the Troubles in
Belfast. It has argued that existing interpretations of that relation-
ship, while ostensibly accurate, have failed to factor the spatial and
religio-political complexity of Belfast into their calculations, and in
the process overlooked the fact that death rates were higher in the
heartlands or ‘sanctuaries’ of respective Catholic and Protestant
enclaves. As Shirlow (2003b: pp. 81e82) has already rightly iden-
tiﬁed, peacelines were built ‘around those arenas within which the
most disproportionate patterns of violence transpired’ [our
emphasis]. It appears that within those arenas more complex dy-
namics were at play. Through a novel methodology it has sought to
give quantitative substance to the nebulous spatial concept of the
‘interface’ and the resulting analyses have conﬁrmed the patterns
of fatality observed in relation to peacelines, with death rates once
again higher in zones outside the interface. This is not to argue that
peacelines or interfaces have no role to play in explaining patterns
of fatality during the Troubles; it may well be the case that these
social and physical structures can indeed be associated with dis-
tributions of deaths, acting to channel patterns of aggression and
thereby rendering certain localities more vulnerable than others
(McKittrick et al., 2007: pp.1084e1085,1090e1091,1166,1250), but
this is an area that clearly requires further research. In a longer-
term historical context, interfaces have acted in the Northern
Ireland conﬂict as second-order or performative centres of low-intensity violence rather than fatality, and they continue to oper-
ate as the battlegrounds for ongoing, indeed intensifying de-
mographic disputes.
These ﬁndings matter for a number of reasons. A wealth of
research cited here has established the economic, social and envi-
ronmental harm caused by peacelines. However, the evidence
presented in this paper suggests that it is little wonder that is those
who live nearest to the walls that are most reticent to see them
removed (Byrne et al., 2012: p. 13); over the course of the Troubles
these areas witnessed lower levels of fatality than in neighbouring
‘sanctuary’ zones and it is therefore far from irrational for these
residents to associate their sense of security with proximity to the
peacelines. In the current political context and for the sake of
communities blighted by peacelines, decisions regarding their
future removal need to be based on a closer reading of the spatial
evidence, and a clearer understanding of the historical contexts and
legacies of conﬂict fromwhich they emerged. Taking the long view,
it appears that certain parts of Belfast (Cunningham, 2013: pp. 58e
59), rather than particular types of neighbourhood have acted as
centres of violent conﬂict despite radical changes in the urban
fabric and population base over time. Above all else, the role of
peacelines and interfaces matters because ‘meta-conﬂicts’ matter
(Brubaker, 2002: pp. 173e174; Horowitz, 1991: p. 2) and the focus
on interfaces and peacelines as the primary sites of fatal violence
can provide (albeit unintentionally) a distorting and constitutive
framing which implies that deaths during the Troubles arose pri-
marily out of localised territorial disputes rather than much deeper
political antagonisms.Acknowledgement
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Endnotes
2 For balance, the same analysis was conducted using area as the denominator
rather than population. In this case, the death rate per km2 also increased outside
the interface by 40 percent from 44 in the interface to 62 in the 50 m range.
3 The 1971 census did not differentiate at lower levels of geography between non-
Christians, Baptists and other Christian splinter churches, of which there are a
plethora represented in Northern Ireland. As a result, the non-Catholic ﬁgure for
that year in theory covers also covers all non-Christians in addition to Protestants.
However, in reality, the number of non-Christians resident in Northern Ireland was
tiny and the term ‘non-Catholic’ can be used as an effective proxy for Protestant.References
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